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Of Batcaves and Clock-towers: Living 
Damaged Lives in Gotham City 
 
James B. South 
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University 
Milwaukee, WI 
 
“My parents taught me a different lesson…. Lying on this 
street—shaking in deep shock—dying for no reason at 
all—they showed me that the world only makes sense 
when you force it to.” Bruce Wayne in Batman: The 
Dark Knight Returns1 
 
“I made a promise to my parents that I would rid the city of the evil that took 
their lives.” 
Bruce Wayne in Batman: Dark Victory2 
 
In Darwyn Cooke’s Batman: Ego, we are given an account of a 
young Bruce Wayne’s Christmas day and evening. The day starts 
nicely enough with gifts, family cheer, and Bruce’s excitement over his 
new Zorro action figure. However, at Christmas dinner, Bruce’s father, 
Dr. Thomas Wayne, receives a phone call updating him on a patient’s 
health. He decides he must go visit the patient and has Bruce ride 
along with him. The patient dies and as Dr. Wayne is covering the 
body, Bruce walks into the room and sees the dead body. Back in the 
car, Bruce expresses his confusion following his first experience with 
death, and the following exchange occurs: 
 
BRUCE: Are you and mom going to die? 
DR. WAYNE: Well, yes we will, Bruce. Everyone passes on. But 
not before our time. And that’s a long way away. 
BRUCE: Promise? 
DR. WAYNE: I promise son.3 
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The sequel to this part of the story is well known: a few weeks later 
the Wayne family goes to a movie and, after the show, Dr. and Mrs. 
Wayne are shot and killed by a robber leaving Bruce an orphan. Dr. 
Wayne was unable to keep his promise. This story points out the fact 
that promises are remarkably fragile human actions: ones made to 
specific people in particular circumstances, and which envision a future 
that may or may not come to pass. So, for example, one need only 
think about the high divorce rates in western industrialized societies to 
recognize how ‘utopian’ promises can be and how recalcitrant reality 
can be in knocking down the future envisioned by promises. 
 
In this essay, I want to try to juxtapose the stories told by some 
comic books, those set in Gotham City and involving Batman, Batgirl, 
and Catwoman, with issues raised by this fragility intrinsic to promises. 
I want to argue that these comic books provide us with an image of 
what I will call, following J. M. Bernstein, “fugitive ethics,” that is, a 
kind of ethical action of which promises are paradigmatic.4 While a 
positive description of what such ethical actions are will be available at 
the end of this essay, for now it is sufficient to note two of their central 
features. First, fugitive ethical actions are actions that are available to 
us only under the conditions of late modern capitalism. As a result, 
fugitive ethical actions are ethical actions that are available to lives 
that are best characterized as damaged in a sense still to be specified. 
In what follows, I first characterize the understanding of modernism 
relevant for my discussion, and then proceed to consider the ways in 
which lives lived under the conditions of modernism can be called 
damaged. After that, I will turn to a more extensive description of 
fugitive ethics. Throughout this essay, I am providing an approach to 
the relation between philosophy and popular culture, one that points to 
a very close convergence of the aims certain forms of philosophy 
possess and those aims certain forms of popular culture possess. 
 
I need to offer one methodological consideration before 
proceeding. Umberto Eco has talked about the dream-like quality of 
superhero comic books, referring to the fact that there is always 
something more to be said with each new issue, while, nonetheless, 
‘before’ and ‘after’ remain hazy.5 There is a kind of eternal present 
involved in the experience of reading comic books. This makes talk 
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about ‘continuity’ between comic books very difficult. Geoff Klock has 
extended Eco’s insight about comic book continuity by pointing to the 
way that “strong work comes to define truth.”6 In other words, certain 
comic books within a series tend to take on additional weight due to a 
variety of factors such as their especially high quality, their 
disproportionate influence on subsequent issues in the series, and their 
reception as canonical for a series. Many of the comics I discuss below 
have managed to attain to this level of strong work as generally 
recognized by the community of comic book writers, artists, and 
readers. Without disputing the account of strong works within a series, 
I would add this point: what constitutes strong work can be indexed to 
the concerns the reader brings to the texts. Thus, I have chosen these 
comics in part because they help illustrate my point, in part because 
they are generally recognized as among the best recent work in 
comics, and in part because of my experience of them. In Eco’s 
dream-like world of the history of comics, I am certain I could have 
found other books to illustrate my argument, just as I am sure there 
are comic books that point in a direction I do not follow here. More 
importantly, though, the comics I discuss here are comics that have 
made a strong impression on me, that have come to define a ‘truth’ 
for me about the universe in which these comics take place and the 
light that universe sheds on our universe.7 Yet, while the selection of 
comics to be discussed is thus ineluctably personal, that fact does not 
make the conclusion I want to draw idiosyncratic, though I recognize 
that as a promise to the reader that I can hope to fulfill only by 
providing the following discussion. 
 
I: Gotham City and Modernism 
 
At the beginning of Batman: Year One (Miller, et al., 1987), we 
see Lieutenant James Gordon, newly appointed to the Gotham City 
Police Department, arriving in the city via train. Paralleling his arrival, 
we see the return of Bruce Wayne via airplane to Gotham City after an 
absence of twelve years. Gordon’s arrival is drawn in black and white—
grey sky, grey train; it’s all wires, bridges, trestles, and train tracks. 
His internal thoughts in this first panel: “Gotham City. Maybe it’s all I 
deserve now. Maybe it’s just my time in Hell.” In the second panel, we 
see the interior of the train: it’s overcrowded, people standing in the 
aisle, luggage weighing down the caging that is overhead. Gordon 
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continues: “Train’s no way to come to Gotham…in an airplane from 
above, all you’d see are the streets and buildings. Fool you into 
thinking it’s civilized.” When we see Bruce Wayne, it’s from outside his 
plane. We see him as if he were alone without any of the overcrowding 
of the train. His thoughts: “From here, it’s clean shafts of concrete and 
snowy rooftops. The work of men who died generations ago. From 
here, it looks like an achievement. I should have taken the train. I 
should be closer. I should see the enemy.”8 
 
I now want to develop a conceptual apparatus that will help us 
to understand these two scenes and that will set the stage for a 
discussion of life in Gotham City. I begin with a definition of 
modernism. Since any such definition is likely to be contentious, I 
simply want to stipulate one for purposes of discussion, though it is 
one with which I agree. I borrow the description of modernism from 
John Patrick Diggins: 
 
What, specifically, is modernism? As a way of reacting to the 
modern world, modernism is the consciousness of what once 
was presumed to be present and is now seen as missing. It 
might be considered as a series of felt absences, the gap 
between what we know is not and what we desire to be: 
knowledge without truth, power without authority, society 
without spirit, self without identity, politics without virtue, 
existence without purpose, history without meaning.9 
 
There are two aspects to this account of modernism that I want 
to emphasize. First, Diggins mentions a series of absences that cluster 
around the fact that meanings previously available to human beings 
are no longer available. One characteristic way of discussing these 
absences is by talking about the “disenchantment of the world.”10 As 
we shall see, the traditional resources for moral evaluation and 
commitment are among the most prominent of our losses and foster 
our disenchantment in a particularly significant manner. Second, while 
Diggins does not try to provide any content for the rather neutral term 
“feeling” it seems worthwhile to have at our disposal a thicker, more 
descriptive, understanding of the feeling generated by the absence of 
meaning. In fact, Diggins subsequently speaks of the “intellectual 
wounds of modernity,” and I want to draw attention to that phrase.11 
Certainly, ‘wound,’ conveys content considerably less neutral than 
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“feeling,” and it seems right that the feeling engendered by the 
disenchantment of the world be characterized by this richer, less 
neutral, term. Moreover, this richer term begins to provide us with 
some sense of what is at stake in modernist understandings of our 
predicament. 
 
For his part, Bernstein has delineated the ways that the good 
life as traditionally understood is no longer possible for us under the 
conditions of modernism. On his account, our lives as we currently live 
them are damaged.12 There are two situations that stand behind this 
claim, one having to do with the social conditions in which we must 
live, the other having to do with the way in which the scope of ethical 
action has been increasingly “privatized.” The foundational description 
of the social conditions under which we must live our lives privileges 
Weber’s concept of rationalization, and the most obvious success story 
of rationalization is science. Science is masterfully effective and 
successful, and this effectiveness bestows on science an aura of 
authority. The success of science breeds more success until, finally, we 
come to believe that anything can be understood in principle, that is, 
that “we can master all things by calculation.”13 This rationalization 
process is a key factor in the disenchantment of the world so keenly 
described in modernist thought. The second situation leading to 
damaged lives is Weber’s famous “bureaucratization” thesis wherein 
social relations are rendered calculable in accord with the ruling ethos 
of science. Under this condition, no social relation remains 
uncontaminated by considerations of efficiency, calculation, and the 
like. Indeed, these considerations concerning efficiency coupled with 
the disenchantment of the world account for Weber’s description of the 
“iron cage” of rationality that ensnares us all, warping our experience 
of the world and trapping us in a set of social relations that can only 
be described as ‘wounding.’14 Given this understanding of 
disenchantment, it makes perfect sense for James Gordon to express 
skepticism towards the idea that Gotham City is “civilized,” and perfect 
sense for Bruce Wayne to view the city as “the enemy.” 
 
II: Damaged Life 
 
If Gotham City can be viewed as representing a rationalized 
world—one that wounds—then it should follow that its inhabitants are 
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leading damaged lives. How, though, can we best represent the notion 
of a damaged life? Bernstein presents a compelling framework for this 
task by focusing on what he calls ‘affective skepticism’: “…a systematic 
separation between the rational and universalistic norms of a 
rationalized practice, on the one hand, and the concrete, unique 
agent-specific motivation for pursuing that practice on the other.”15 In 
Alan Moore’s famous Batman: The Killing Joke16, we can see a 
representation of such affective skepticism. 
 
This comic gives us an origin story for the Joker, one of 
Batman’s most famous foes. In a series of flashbacks, we learn that 
the Joker, whose real name we never learn in the comic, was a down 
on his luck would-be stand-up comedian before the series of events 
that turned him into the Joker. He was married, and there was a child 
on the way; he had left a “good job” as a lab assistant at a chemical 
plant in order to pursue his dream of becoming a comedian; and he 
was thus forced to prove himself as a husband and father. To try to 
provide for his family, he has involved himself with a couple of low 
level criminals who are planning to rob a playing card company. The 
most direct access to the Playing Card company is through the 
chemical plant where the future Joker once worked. On the day of the 
robbery, the future Joker is told that his wife had a fatal accident at 
home. His two criminal cohorts force him to continue his part in the 
robbery. When the robbery goes wrong, his two cohorts are shot by 
the police. At that moment, Batman arrives, has the cops stop 
shooting, and goes in pursuit of the soon-to-be Joker. Batman pursues 
him until his only possible escape is to jump into a vat of chemicals. 
When he is flushed out of the vat into a sewer away from the plant, 
thereby escaping Batman, he discovers the chemicals have left him 
permanently disfigured: his skin white, his hair green, and his face 
permanently disfigured. This “one bad day” creates the Joker. The 
conjunction of his disastrous attempt to prove himself and the 
accidental death of his wife is more than he can take. He describes the 
result of this one bad day: “When I saw what a black, awful joke the 
world was, I went crazy as a coot.” 
 
The idea of proving something recurs in the Joker’s criminal plan 
unfolding in the book’s present, with equally disastrous results. His 
plan is to prove to Batman that he and Batman are no different—
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indeed, that any person is simply a series of bad events away from 
craziness. This radical contingency is continually represented by 
imagery of cards and card playing, especially the joker card—what 
happens to us, it seems, is accidental. Without some master narrative 
to tell ourselves about the world and its sense, there simply is no 
sense; and The Joker has lost any narrative that could make the world 
sensible. The Joker mocks Batman in their final confrontation in an 
abandoned amusement park: “You have to keep pretending that life 
makes sense, that there’s some point to all the struggling.”17 Before 
arriving at this final point, he had gone to Commissioner Gordon’s 
apartment, shot his daughter Barbara, stripped Barbara of her clothes 
as she lay paralyzed on the floor, took pictures of her, and kidnapped 
the commissioner. Later in the abandoned amusement park, he 
tortures Gordon and shows him pictures of his naked, helpless 
daughter in an attempt to drive him mad, thereby proving his point 
that we’re all just one bad day away from insanity. When Batman 
arrives at the park, he discovers that Gordon has not gone crazy, that, 
indeed, Gordon is determined the Joker be brought in “by the book” to 
“show him that our way works.” Batman confronts the Joker, who 
argues his case: “It’s all a joke. Everything anybody ever valued or 
struggled for. It’s all a monstrous demented gag. So why can’t you see 
the funny side? Why aren’t you laughing?” Batman responds: “Because 
I’ve heard it before and it wasn’t funny the first time.”18 Once 
defeated, the Joker, former failed stand-up comic, tells a joke to 
explain why he can never let Batman help him: 
 
See, there are these two guys in a lunatic asylum…and one 
night, they decide they don’t like living in an asylum anymore. 
They decide they’re going to escape! So, like, they get up onto 
the roof. And there, just across this narrow gap, they see the 
rooftops of the town, stretching away in the moonlight. 
Stretching away to freedom. Now, the first guy, he jumps right 
across with no problem. But his friend, his friend daren’t make 
the leap. Y’see…y’see he’s afraid of falling. So then the first guy 
has an idea…he says, “Hey! I have my flashlight with me! I’ll 
shine it across the gap between the buildings. You can walk 
along the beam and join me!” B-but the second guy just shakes 
his head. He suh-says…he says, “Wh-what do you think I am? 
Crazy? You’d turn it off when I was halfway across.”19 
 
The comic ends with both The Joker and Batman laughing at this joke. 
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It is clear that The Joker has succumbed to affective skepticism 
on a rather massive scale. If it makes sense to say that there can be a 
coherence in madness—and Joker’s perfectly “rational” plan to prove 
that everyone is “one bad day” away from being like him certainly 
seems coherent—then the only motive he has for acting comes from 
features internal to his madness. And yet the proof he’s offering bears 
all the hallmarks of an experiment. The Joker may be mad, but he 
understands and accepts the rudiments of rationalized thought. More 
formally, The Joker has lost touch with any values external to his 
practice, as is evident from his willingness to kill, wound, and torture 
people in an effort to prove his point. As an interpretation of the joke 
at the end of the story, I read the asylum as representing the 
disenchanted world that we all live in as a result of rationalization and 
bureaucratization. The challenge we face can be summed up nicely by 
recognizing that while it is possible to escape the asylum by various 
forms of flight, those forms are at the same time remarkably unstable 
strategies. The fear of falling is real, but the strategies available to us 
in a rationalized, disenchanted world are only various forms of fantasy, 
about as stable as a flashlight’s beam. 
 
One concrete way that Bernstein shows the damage done to us 
in our living lives under the conditions of modernism argument 
involves the debate between internalists and externalists in moral 
theory20 In brief, externalists hold that justifying reasons for moral 
actions and motivating reasons for such actions are in principle distinct 
while internalists hold that they ought to converge. The externalist will 
try to justify a moral norm by appealing to abstract principles that 
are universally applicable in an attempt to show that a) such moral 
norms apply to everyone and that b) they transcend self-interest. 
Thus, in condemning theft, the externalist might provide reasons that 
work on an abstract level, say, respect for property or maximization of 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but still leave me 
wondering why I should not steal. Part of the problem here is that, as 
Bernstein points out, any such justification aimed at everyone is likely 
to be “agent neutral;” but if the reason is not compelling to an agent, 
it need not be compelling to me. Moreover, it is simply part of our 
intuitive notion of morality that it should provide reasons that go 
beyond what may currently motivate me to act. Thus, the argument 
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against theft should work even for those who are inclined to steal; but, 
again, that means there will be a disconnect between the set of beliefs 
and desires that motivate me to steal and the argument against 
stealing. It is difficult to see how to connect those two sets of reasons. 
Internalists argue that the only way to do so is by rejecting the 
externality of justificatory reasons. That is, any reason for action must 
be one that motivates me from the inside, as it were. 
 
A standard objection to such a view is that any reason that is 
internally motivating to me must be one I can already accept, thus 
limiting my moral point of view to that sphere within which I have 
comfort, or, to put it another way, all my moral reasons would be ones 
that do not challenge me. The potential for a self-satisfied morality is 
all too clear. Bernstein’s move, at this point, is very interesting. He 
essentially denies that there’s any substantive moral difference 
between these two views, pointing out that pretty much any set of 
external reasons can be internalized: 
 
The fundamental objection to externalist theories, which in fact 
supports the claim that they are external, is not that they 
cannot in principle be incorporated into individuals’ motivational 
sets (almost anything can) but that they are representative and 
functional components of a generalised experience of 
disenchantment and societal rationalisation that hurts.21 
 
In other words, internalism as a position in moral theory is best 
viewed not as a theoretical demand, but as an expressive response to 
the disenchantment brought about by rationalization, a response that 
is necessary because the gap between motivational reasons and 
justifying reasons hurts us as we try to make our way through the 
world in morally responsive ways. 
 
Given this experience of hurt, which is manifested 
philosophically in moral theory as a need for justificatory and 
motivational reasons to converge, it might be useful to think about 
responses to this experience of hurt. Bernstein mentions several 
expressions of this hurt brought about by disenchantment. Direct 
expressions of the pain we feel include disillusionment, alienation, 
boredom, and anger, while indirect expressions of this hurt manifest 
themselves in cynicism, focusing on one part of life in an attempt to 
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make the whole meaningful, religious fundamentalism, obsessive 
consumerism, and a valuing of pure experience of an erotic or 
aesthetic sort (Bernstein 2004, 19-20). Returning to Batman: Year 
One, it is worth noting what we see in the panels immediately 
following the ones that introduce us to Gordan and Wayne: Gordon is 
accosted by a religious cultist as he’s getting off the train, while 
Wayne, the rich, single playboy is accosted at the airport by television 
reporters. Here we see two of the most obvious forms of flight 
associated with the hurt of modern rationalized society: religious 
fundamentalism and an obsession with life-style. 
 
Even if, we can view Gotham City and its problems as the work 
of disenchanted reason, a further question remains. Why does 
scientific thought result in a disenchanted world? The answer to that 
question comes down to the fact that the overwhelming tendency of 
reason is to advance what Bernstein calls “identity thinking.” The 
central feature of such thinking involves subsuming particulars under 
universals, where universals have the function of simplifying, making 
coherent, explaining, and unifying particulars. The dangers here are 
pretty obvious, since particulars are always richer than the universal 
under which they are subsumed. That is, universals, whether they take 
the form of concept terms or scientific explanations, leave out 
something about the particular that resists unification and identity.22 
Two items may be identical as they fall under a universal, but they are 
not identical as particulars. The tension, then, turns on whether one 
wants to criticize scientific rationalism for its omission of the relevant 
non-identity characteristics of items, or accept science and lose the 
particular characteristics. Obviously, criticizing scientific rationalism is 
a risky act. If you focus, for example, on the way in which scientific 
rationalism has some non-rational foundation—a focus central to much 
twentieth century philosophy from Heidegger to Kuhn—you simply fail 
to close the gap between justificatory and motivational reasons for 
acting. So, for example, if you want to say that the legitimacy of 
science rests on some historical accident, or the way in which it is 
inextricably tied to a discredited onto-theology, then motivational 
reasons will be reasons, but ultimately irrational. That is, the two sorts 
of reasons are not connected. But if that is the case, then motivating 
reasons are still subject to criticism from reason, that is, affective 
skepticism still looms as a likely result.23 Of course, the other 
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possibility that awaits is Joker-like: simply accepting the irrationality. 
Batman may laugh at the Joker’s joke, but it is clear that he is the one 
who has jumped across the gap between the asylum and the world. 
How might he have done this, and, more importantly, how might he 
have done this while not giving into madness? 
 
One possible response canvassed by Bernstein is that we may 
criticize rationality not because it is rational, but because it is not 
rational enough: 
 
Only an expansion of reason, rationality, and cognition will 
answer the dilemma of disenchantment; and if this expansion is 
to be keyed to the diagnosis of scientific rationalism as a 
process of systematically negating particularity in favor of 
universality (the movement of rationalization as identity 
thinking), then the direction of expansion will be the inclusion in 
reasoning of ineliminable moments of dependency and 
particularity.24 
 
The features of dependence and particularity are crucial. By making 
reason recognize the contours of the world in ways that block identity 
thinking, it might be possible to rescue the intrinsic rationality of 
motivating reasons, that is, it might be possible to connect justification 
and motivation. However, the generality of this suggestion is 
problematic. What we need are examples of “ineliminable moments of 
dependency and particularity.” One place to find such examples is by 
considering human actions that are irreducible to general principles 
and their application. The practice of promising is one such type of 
action. 
 
III-Promises, Promises 
 
In Batgirl: Year One25, we find out how Barbara Gordon 
becomes Batgirl (this is the same Barbara Gordon who, after retiring 
from her duties as Batgirl is shot by The Joker). She is a successful, 
very bright young adult who is living a very unsatisfying (to her) life as 
a librarian. Her days behind a bank of computers at the library are 
hounded by a paralyzing tedium. She is misperceived routinely by 
others, that is, others are failing to see her particularity by their focus 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop Culture, (2006): pg. 235-253. Publisher Link. This article is © Rowman & 
Littlefield and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Rowman & Littlefiled 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Rowman & Littlefield. 
12 
 
on her job, or her height, or even her status as daughter. She tries 
several ways to break out of her constrained life—she applies to the 
police academy and the FBI—but is rejected by both. She is looking for 
“anything that will get me out of where I am. Where I don’t want to 
be.”26 For a costume party, she decides to go wearing a female 
variation on a Batman costume. By the end of the evening, she’s been 
dubbed “Batgirl” and has come to the attention of Batman. When 
asked why she wants to be a costumed crime fighter, she responds: 
“You may have all the tools of the trade, but you don’t have a 
monopoly on wanting to help. I’ll tell you why, you big scary goon. 
Because I can.” And she immediately adds: “I can see Gotham’s 
future. And without people like you and pixie boots and me, this place 
doesn’t have much to look forward to.”27 
 
On the surface, this portrayal of Barbara Gordon’s motivation for 
becoming Batgirl would seem to contrast starkly with Bruce Wayne’s 
story. When young Bruce Wayne saw his parents brutally murdered by 
a robber, he promised that he would rid Gotham City of such evil. For 
a long time, he saw this as a necessity forced upon him; something 
about which he had no choice. In his internalization of such an 
external demand, Bruce Wayne is the very embodiment of the damage 
done by a disenchanted world. Eventually, though, he came to see it 
as a choice he made: “I thought I didn’t have a choice about being the 
Batman. That Gotham City chose me to protect her. That is wrong. 
Ever since the night my parents were taken from me, I made the 
choice. It is a good choice.”28 The circumstances under which Bruce 
Wayne came to see that he had made a choice involved the 
renunciation of a chance at a romantic relationship. In denying 
one future, he claims the present and its future for himself. In short, I 
think there is a nice parallel here between the choice Barbara Gordon 
makes (“Because I can”) and the choice Bruce Wayne makes. Why I 
think this is significant will take a bit of working out, but will involve 
two points, one having to do with the purely human status of Bruce 
Wayne and Barbara Gordon, while the other has to do with the 
intension of the word “can” in Barbara Gordon’s motivation for her 
decision. 
 
One way into the first issue is to ask why it is that Bruce Wayne 
and Barbara Gordon choose to help in the way that they do. After all, 
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they have no superpowers, but are purely human. That is, it’s not the 
case that by their very nature they somehow cannot fit into standard 
roles and practices. Bruce Wayne could become, say, a policeman. His 
choice to protect Gotham City takes, let’s face it, a pretty counter-
intuitive and bizarre form: dressing up like a bat and working outside 
normal legal channels. So too in the case of Barbara Gordon: why this 
choice and not some other? If we remember the context of their 
choices—living damaged lives in a disenchanted world—it is easier to 
see what might be going on. In addition, we must keep in mind the 
ineliminable particularity of Bruce and Barbara as agents. While the 
police can protect and serve, and while policemen can be honest and 
trustworthy—although the Batman comics give us many examples of 
corrupt cops—nonetheless, the police, indeed, the entire set of justice 
institutions, are complicit in the rationalized, disenchanted world that 
is Gotham City. If Batman were a policeman, he would be doing little 
more than offering consolation to the citizens of Gotham City, when 
what they need is the promise of something more, the promise of 
some sort of experience that is not deformed by disenchantment and 
that holds out some promise for hope. In a crime-ridden and corrupt 
city such as Gotham City, it is clear that traditional authority has 
lost its luster; what else could be expected in a disenchanted world? 
As we saw Diggins point out, the absence of authority and its 
replacement with power is a basic condition of modernity. Thus, what 
the disenchanted world needs is the re-establishment of authority 
without its juridicolegal context, which would render that authority 
prey to skeptical reason. Batman and Batgirl can be seen as sources of 
authority precisely by the choices they make that set them outside the 
legal context. 
 
But there is another lesson, I think, that can be learned from 
Barbara Gordon’s story. After all, she becomes someone with not only 
one superhero identity, but two. Batgirl: Year One tells the story of 
Barbara’s becoming Batgirl, but also points to her future, one that she 
has no way of perceiving at the time of Batgirl: Year One. The reader 
knows that Barbara Gordon both is and is not “divining” her future in 
her taking on the persona of Batgirl. In the dream-like world of comic 
continuity, the Batgirl who comes to be now also is the Batgirl who is 
shot and permanently paralyzed by the Joker in The Killing Joke and 
later emerges as Oracle, information gatherer and crime fighter, She 
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even becomes a lead character in her own comic series Birds of Prey. 
While Barbara may not know her future, the book is filled with 
references to it. She starts by talking about the nature of Cassandra’s 
oracles, portending a future that she was powerless to have an effect 
on. In trying to anticipate her own future, Barbara states: “I have to 
find another path. Divine my own future. One uniquely mine. Not a 
page from someone else’s book. Not a fate that begins and ends on 
page one… To dad, I’m all talk about digging for information. I won’t 
be some glorified “answer lady” for the cops. I want to be in on the 
action. Anything that will get me out of where I am. Where I don’t 
want to be” (Beatty, et al., 12-13). In the very panel in which Barbara 
expresses her desire to be anywhere but where she is, we see her 
sitting behind computers in the library, looking out through a window 
in a scene that clearly calls to mind her bank of computers in the clock 
tower where she lives and operates as Oracle. 
 
One way to understand a promise is to recognize it as consisting 
of three elements: a) it takes place in the present and its context; b) it 
imagines a future that is not imaginable from the present except by 
the very fulfillment of the promise; and c) it is powerless in relation to 
what might happen in the future (Bernstein 2004, 436). In Barbara’ 
Gordon’s story, we have the very nature of a promise playing out in 
front of us. Her promise (“Because I can”) does in fact take place in 
the present, imagines a future (one in which she helps), and is 
nonetheless powerless in relation to what reality, in the form of the 
Joker, has to offer. The fragility of promising is made concrete in the 
fragility of Barbara Gordon in the face of the Joker’s bullet. Her 
“because I can” thus doubly represents “hopefulness in the teeth of 
intransigent reality” (Bernstein 2004, 436). Her promise to become 
Batgirl is at the very same time her promise to find ways of keeping 
that promise when the promise has been thwarted by reality. Within 
her promise to be Batgirl, her promise to be Oracle is inscribed as well. 
Both the nobility of the promise and its fragility are held up for the 
reader’s inspection.29  
 
IV-Fugitive Ethics 
 
Bernstein plausibly argues that the only way authority can be 
experienced is on the back of fugitive ethical acts: “Certain empirical 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop Culture, (2006): pg. 235-253. Publisher Link. This article is © Rowman & 
Littlefield and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Rowman & Littlefiled 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Rowman & Littlefield. 
15 
 
events have the status of both actualizing a possibility and in so doing 
making a promise about the future…. Since such events both flee from 
ordinary empirical experience and are intrinsically ephemeral and 
transient, I consider them “fugitives””30 That is, what would give 
Batman and Batgirl authority, as opposed to the power of the police, is 
precisely the way in which their actions embody a fugitive character, 
one that is represented concretely by their working outside the law, 
but can be philosophically explicated in the convergence of motivating 
and justifying reasons.31 This convergence manifests itself in their 
promising. In considering one more example from the Batman 
universe, I hope to tie together all the threads of my discussion. 
 
Consider Selina Kyle, the once and future Catwoman. In Darwyn 
Cooke’s Selina’s Big Score32, we see Selina trying to pick up the pieces 
of a life that had spiraled out of control, leaving her no choice but to 
fake her own death. On returning to Gotham City, she meets Chantel, 
the girlfriend of a mobster named Falcone. Chantel has overheard 
Falcone talking about a big chunk of money and she wants Selina to 
help her “to rip these fools off.”33 After some questioning by Selina, 
her motives become clear: 
 
Me? I know who I am…what I am. I’m not ashamed of it, right? 
‘Cause when it’s time, everybody does what they have to to get 
over. I look at you and I know you hear what I’m sayin’. You 
spent some time at it, but you got clear—and that’s what I 
want…to get clear…clear of this pig Falcone. I want to erase 
every sickening thing I’ve had to do to hold it together. I could 
feed you a pile about my kid, but that’s none of your nevermind. 
I could blubber about my old sick mama and get all country and 
western on your ass, but the stone truth is it’s me. I’m sick of it. 
Like I’d rather die, right? So maybe by doing one more really 
bad thing I can make something good happen. For me, for my 
little girl. I’m not talking about right or wrong. I’m talking about 
basic human dignity.34 
 
These words remind Selina of a time when they were spoken to her. 
Over the course of the book, which inaugurated a new Catwoman 
comic series, Selina commits to a new sort of life while trying to 
understand the idea of basic human dignity. While this new life is not 
one of conventional morality, to be sure, it is one committed to helping 
others, especially those in the East End of Gotham City. When she 
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returns to Gotham City after killing off her Catwoman persona, she has 
a particularly harrowing adventure capturing a man who had been 
killing hookers. It is then that she’s able to reclaim her Catwoman 
persona, but for a different purpose. Her words: 
 
For a long time, all I could think about was pain—my own and 
my family’s. And that pain defined who I was, and ultimately 
just caused more until there was nothing left for me beyond 
that. But today I’m not thinking about the crooked cops and 
politicians. I’m not thinking about the wife-beaters and rapists, 
the mobsters. I’ll get to them eventually. No, right now, all I can 
think about is how good I’m going to feel when that sun goes 
down. And you can’t argue with happiness, can you?35 
 
What is so compelling about Selina’s story is that it provides a perfect 
representation of a disenchanted, damaging world in which the major 
ethical feat available to humans is not being crushed by others. At the 
same time, these passages and their accompanying images promise 
the realization that while futures may be grim and lives may be 
damaged, moments of true happiness are possible and moments of 
genuine ethical acting are available. As Bernstein states, “The 
world is disenchanted, but it is not utterly closed in on itself: there are 
moments of happiness (and not just pleasure or illusory happiness), 
and there are the fragmented and heterogeneous that do not fit with 
the course of the world.”36 
 
Indeed, I think it striking that despite the difficult and damaged 
lives led by Bruce Wayne, Barbara Gordon, and Selina Kyle, one of the 
most notable features of the comics I’m talking about concerns their 
happiness. In almost every book, this happiness takes a specific form: 
the characters fly through the air, literally defying gravity. The 
expression of freedom on their faces and the joyousness of their flight 
are repeatedly depicted in the face of the monstrous and irrational 
crimes they see enacted and try to prevent. Fugitive ethical acts are 
acts that can cause happiness in otherwise damaged lives. Yet at the 
same time, there are reminders that the happiness and the acts that 
cause it exact a price. The price is most visible in the fact that none of 
them maintains a long-standing relationship; they have given up the 
usual forms of private satisfaction. Also, it is notable that none of them 
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live in ordinary places: Batman spends more time in his cave than in 
Bruce Wayne’s mansion; Selina lives at the top of an abandoned 
tenement in Gotham City’s seedy East End, and Barbara Gordon, no 
longer Batgirl after being shot and paralyzed by the Joker, now lives in 
a clock tower where she helps Batman and others as Oracle. But, of 
course, this graphical depiction of happiness is just that—a graphical 
depiction of the happiness that results from doing what is in accord 
with “basic human dignity,” or to put it another way, the experience of 
having one’s motivational and justificatory reasons coincide, or, to put 
it another way, by making a promise—“because I can.” 
 
By way of conclusion, I will point out a lesson this essay 
discloses. I’ve shown that the lives of Bruce Wayne, Barbara Gordon, 
and Selina Kyle, as graphically represented in some comic books, are 
representation of lives led in possibility, a possibility that transcends 
current practices. Thus, while their lives are represented as lived under 
the conditions of modernism, with all the damage and hurt entailed by 
those conditions, they also are represented as exemplifications of 
promise; exemplifications of the possibility of fugitive ethical acts. 
While recognizing the fictional nature of these characters, and the 
problems of continuity, what remains from my reading of these books 
is the claim that these characters’ actions are revelatory of an 
experience of possibility. Of course, on one understanding of 
philosophy, the revelation and explication of this experience of 
possibility is also one of philosophy’s tasks.37 Indeed, in a 
disenchanted world, the representation of these possibilities in popular 
culture may be one of few chances for us to view them in a thematic 
and not merely fugitive manner. Yet the very oddity of the medium’s 
characters—superheroes—reinforces how out of the ordinary such 
experiences are these days. And while the characters in Batman 
related comics are not represented as explicating this experience of 
possibility, they can be read as revealing it. In this way, at least, a 
task of philosophy can be performed in a medium of popular culture.38 
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